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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. 
Fundamentally, this case asks the Court to consider the nature of a deficiency judgment 
pursued after a judicial foreclosure. A deficiency judgment determines whether a creditor can 
execute against the non-collateral of the debtor to satisfy its indebtedness as determined by the 
foreclosure. It is a simple post-judgment execution proceeding. 
Similarly, the existence or nonexistence of a deficiency judgment does not change what 
has already been decided-that a secured party has an interest in pmiicular collateral, which it 
can liquidate up to the amount of the indebtedness as already determined by the foreclosure 
judgment. 
Because a deficiency proceeding is a post-judgment execution matter, fee awards for 
prosecuting or defending the matter should be analyzed under I.C. § 12-120(5). The district court 
improperly awarded Gordon Paving its fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). 
However, the court properly recognized that the lack of a deficiency judgment does not 
alter whether the secured party can continue to liquidate collateral to satisfy its indebtedness. 
And, it properly awarded AgStar its fees for work related to liquidating the collateral. 
AgStar asks this Court to affirm the district court's order allowing the personal property 
collateral sale and granting AgStar's exemption to the royalty check. It also asks this Court to 
affirm the award of collections fees to AgStar. And it asks this Court to make the district court's 
decisions consistent-the Court should hold that a deficiency judgment proceeding is a post-
judgment matter not entitling Gordon Paving to attorney fees and costs. 
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Facts. 
In addition to the facts already laid out by AgStar and Gordon Paving in their respective 
opening briefs, AgStar also notes that the district court's decision to allow AgStar to apply the 
royalty check to its judgment was based on the fact that the royalties were AgStar's collateral. 
(See Tr. p. 461. 25; p. 47 11. 1-25 (Feb. 9, 2015).) 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON CROSS-APPEAL 
AgStar seeks costs and attorney fees for defending the cross-appeal as authorized by 
I.A.R. 40 and 41. AgStar bases its claim for fees on LC.§ 12-120(5) or, alternatively, the parties' 
agreement or LC.§ 12-120(3). The proper basis for its claim depends on this Com1's resolution 
of the case. 
III. REPLY ARGUMENT 
A. The Deficiency Proceeding Cannot Be a "Civil Action" Under LC.§ 12-120(3), and 
Is Rather an Action to Collect on the Foreclosure Judgment. 
The deficiency motion and the related evidentiary hearing cannot by definition be a "civil 
action." A "civil action" is defined by LR.C.P. 3(a) as follows: 
A civil action is commenced by the filing of a complaint petition or 
application with the court. Any filing party shall be designated as the plaintiff or 
petitioner, and any party against whom the same is filed shall be designated as the 
defendant or respondent. Complaints, petitions or applications shall be filed with 
a completed Supreme Court approved case information sheet in the following 
civil cases: guardianship, conservatorship, adoption, termination of parental 
rights, involuntary commitment, and child protection act. This case information 
sheet shall be exempt from disclosure according to LC.A.R. 32. No claim, 
controversy or dispute, may be submitted to any court in the state for 
determination or judgment without filing a complaint or petition or application as 
provided in these rules; nor shall any judgment or decree be entered by any court 
without service of process upon all parties affected by such judgment or decree in 
the manner prescribed by these rules. 
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Court looks to this definition for the purpose of attorney fee determinations. See, e.g., Smith 
v. Washington County Idaho, 150 Idaho 388, 391-92, 247 P.3d 615, 618-19 (2010). A civil 
action is one "commenced by the filing of a complaint ... with the court," and a proceeding that 
does not involve such a filing is not a civil action for the purposes of awarding attorney fees. 
I.R.C.P. 3(a); see Smith, 150 Idaho at 391-92, 247 P.3d at 618-19 (indicating that a petition for 
judicial review of an administrative decision is not a civil action). 
The deficiency judgment proceeding was commenced by AgStar's motion after the 
district court had already entered the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. (R. at 220-21.) 
AgStar did not file a complaint or other new action for the deficiency-it filed a post-judgment 
motion within the same case number as the foreclosure. Plainly, the deficiency proceeding 
cannot be a new civil action under I.R.C.P. 3(a). Rather, it is a post-judgment motion based on 
the previously entered foreclosure judgment. 
Further, the deficiency proceeding cannot be considered a separate civil action because 
that would cause the district court's judgment denying the deficiency to be improper. Rule 3(a) 
would not sanction that judgment unless it was derived from the original foreclosure complaint: 
"No claim, controversy or dispute, may be submitted to any court in the state for determination 
or judgment without filing a complaint or petition or application as provided in these rules." 
Thus the deficiency proceeding cannot be a standalone civil action under LC. § 12-
120(3)-it must arise out of the original foreclosure case. Here, the deficiency proceeding took 
place as a post-foreclosure judgment motion hearing. And while the district court entered a 
separate judgment on that motion (R. at 239), that judgment was derived from the initial 
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judgment with its determination on indebtedness as specified by I. C. § 6-108 ("No 
court in the state of Idaho shall have jurisdiction to enter a deficiency judgment in any case 
involving a foreclosure of a mortgage on real property in any amount greater than the difference 
between the mortgage indebtedness, as determined by the decree, plus costs of foreclosure and 
sale, and the reasonable value of the mortgaged property, to be determined by the court in the 
decree upon the taking of evidence of such value." (emphasis added)). 
Gordon Paving notes that a deficiency proceeding under a deed of trust pursuant to LC. § 
45-1512 is a separate civil action. The differences in the deed of trust statute and I.C. § 6-108 
illustrate, however, that deficiency judgments from judicial foreclosures are to be treated as post-
judgment proceedings, not as their own actions. Again, I. C. § 6-108 states: 
No court in the state of Idaho shall have jurisdiction to enter a deficiency 
judgment in any case involving a foreclosure of a mortgage on real property in 
any amount greater than the difference between the mortgage indebtedness, as 
determined by the decree, plus costs of foreclosure and sale, and the reasonable 
value of the mortgaged property, to be determined by the court in the decree upon 
the taking of evidence of such value. 
(Emphases added.) The statute specifically contemplates that the district court will determine 
whether a deficiency judgment should issue within the same foreclosure case, after the court 
enters a decree determining the overall indebtedness. In contrast, in a deed of trust deficiency 
proceeding, the indebtedness has yet been determined, and it requires a separate complaint or 
petition to be filed as required under I.R.C.P. 3(a). See I.C. § 45-1512. 
In sum, the deficiency judgment proceeding is not its own civil action. It is a collections 
matter, occurring after foreclosure and arising out of the foreclosure decree. 
- 4 -
79873948.2 004 7071-00006 
If the Deficiency Proceeding Docs Not Arise from the Foreclosure Judgment, It 
Must Arise from the Parties' Agreement, Which Bars Gordon Paving from Seeking 
Its Fees and Costs; the Provision Is Not Unconscionable. 
The deficiency judgment does not arise out of the ether. AgStar argues that the right to a 
deficiency comes from the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure itself, which is consistent with 
Gordon Paving's merger argument. However, if the Court somehow decides that LC. § 12-
120(3) applies, the parties' agreement governs the dispute and bars Gordon Paving from seeking 
its fees, as argued in AgStar's opening brief. 
Gordon Paving's only true argument against the attorney fee provision in the parties' 
agreement is that it is unconscionable. With regard to unconscionability, the district court found 
that: 
And the second reason that I find that it does not apply is that it would be, 
in my view, unconscionable to have a clause that allows a prevailing party in a 
case I'll look into the prevailing party analysis here in a minute - a prevailing 
party have to pay their own fees. Then the other side, as a nonprevailing party, 
could collect their fees. That is the interpretation that has sort of been given to this 
clause, and I just don't accept that, and I'm not going to enforce that. 
(Tr. p. 21 11. 20-25; p. 2211. 1-5 (Nov. 10, 2014).) 
While the district court viewed a contract provision disallowing a "prevailing party" from 
collecting its fees to be unconscionable, this sort of provision has already been sanctioned as 
enforceable under Idaho law. In Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., the Supreme Court affirmed the 
hearing court's denial of attorney fees to a prevailing party, based on a contract provision that 
required each party to bear its own costs, including attorney fees. 141 Idaho 809, 818-19, 118 
P.3d 141, 150-51 (2005). The Supreme Court reasoned that 
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[a]s recognized by the Court of Appeals, a general entitlement to an award of 
attorney's fees under LC.§ 12-120 will not override a valid agreement between 
parties which limits the dollar amount that may be claimed or awarded. In this 
case the parties contracted for a zero dollar amount or claim with respect to an 
award of attorney's fees. 
Id. (citation omitted). "[T]he Idaho Supreme Court has ... determined that parties may contract 
away their statutory right to attorney's fees altogether." Novus Franchising, Inc. v. Oksendahl, 
Nos. 07-1964 & 07-1965, 2008 WL 835681, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 27, 2008) (citing Moore, 141 
Idahoat817-18, 118P.3dat 149-50). 
Thus, the contract's attorney fee provision is not unconscionable as a matter oflaw even 
though it prevents Gordon Paving from collecting its fees and costs. 
Further, Gordon Paving raises an entirely new argument for the first time on appeal 
regarding procedural and substantive unconscionability of the contract term. In general, this 
Court does not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 
227, 91 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2004). 
Nowhere below did Gordon Paving make any argument that the contract should be 
voided for unconscionability. (See R. at 298-302.) The only mention of unconscionability is the 
district court's holding that, as a matter of law, such a fee provision is unconscionable. Of 
course, as discussed, this holding is contrary to Idaho precedent. Gordon Paving should not be 
allowed to raise the issue of unconscionability for the first time on appeal. 
Lastly, the argument of unconscionability misrepresents the nature of the case. Gordon 
Paving failed to pay back most of the $10 million it borrowed from AgStar, and AgStar has yet 
to be made whole. Gordon Paving brought the foreclosure and pursuit of the deficiency judgment 
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itself due to its default, and there is nothing unconscionable about AgStar's attempts to 
on the indebtedness. 
IV. CROSS-APPEAL ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Did Not Err in Allowing AgStar to Liquidate the Personal 
Property Collateral. 
In the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, the district court held that AgStar had a 
paramount lien in the personal property collateral, and that AgStar was entitled to sell it and 
apply the proceeds to the indebtedness as determined by the judgment. (R. at 179-80.) AgStar's 
failure to obtain a deficiency judgment does not change that. 
Idaho's anti-deficiency statute bars recovery of a deficiency judgment greater than the 
mortgage indebtedness plus costs of foreclosure and sale, minus the reasonable value of the 
property: 
No court in the state of Idaho shall have jurisdiction to enter a deficiency 
judgment in any case involving a foreclosure of a mortgage on real property in 
any amount greater than the difference between the mortgage indebtedness, as 
determined by the decree, plus costs of foreclosure and sale, and the reasonable 
value of the mortgaged property, to be determined by the court in the decree upon 
the taking of evidence of such value. 
I.C. § 6-108. 
The plain language of the statute does not bar a secured creditor from liquidating 
collateral in a serial fashion. The language only bars the entry of a deficiency judgment against 
the defendant personally without a determination of the fair market value of the property. While 
there are no Idaho cases directly on point, other courts that have addressed the issue have held 
that for the purposes of selling additional collateral, anti-deficiency statutes do not apply, and the 
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amount of the credit bid is applied to the debt rather than the fair market value in determining 
whether the creditor may realize on additional collateral. 
For example, in In re Merrick, a case from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Utah 
(Central Division), the debtors executed a note in favor of a bank, secured by both a trust deed on 
a piece of commercial real estate and a trust deed on the debtors' personal residence. 483 B.R. 
236, 237 (Bankr. D. Utah 2012). After the creditor sold the commercial property, and won the 
auction with a credit bid that did not satisfy the total indebtedness, the creditor filed a claim in 
the bankruptcy for the remaining amount due and began pursuing foreclosure against the 
residence. Id at 238-39. The debtors argued that the creditor was barred from doing this by 
Utah's anti-deficiency statute, because the fair market value of the commercial residence 
exceeded the amount of the total indebtedness, and therefore the creditor could not pursue 
recovery on any remaining collateral. Id.at 239. 
The court framed the issue as follows: 
When a note is secured by two pieces of collateral, and the first piece of 
collateral is purchased by credit bid for an amount less than the total indebtedness 
under the note, does [Utah's anti-deficiency statute] require the secured creditor to 
subtract the fair market value of the sold collateral from the total indebtedness 
before pursuing the second piece of collateral? 
Id. Utah's anti-deficiency statute is very similar to Idaho's, stating, in part: 
The court may not render [ a deficiency] judgment for more than the amount by 
which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, 
including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the 
property as of the date of the sale. 
Utah Code§ 57-1-32. 
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The court held that the anti-deficiency statute did not bar recovery against the second 
piece of collateral, stating that the creditor "is permitted to pursue a claim against the [remaining 
collateral] for the remaining indebtedness under the Note without first subtracting the fair market 
value of the [first piece of collateral] because such a claim is not an 'action' under Utah's Anti-
Deficiency Statute." Merrick, 483 B.R. at 241. 
In another case, In re Madera Farms Partnership, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the 
Ninth Circuit was faced with a similar question. 66 B.R. 100 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986). The secured 
creditor held a deed of trust with an assignment of rents clause. Id. at 101. The secured creditor 
had, during the course of the proceedings, stipulated that the fair market value of the real 
property exceeded the debt. Id. at 101-02. At the foreclosure sale, the secured creditor placed a 
winning credit bid in an amount less than the debt. Id. at 102. The secured creditor then sought to 
collect on the remaining debt by applying accrued rents to the deficiency. Id. The secured 
creditor maintained that "the amount bid at the foreclosure sale-not the fair market value of the 
property-should conclusively determine the credit against its claim" and that California's anti-
deficiency provisions did not apply when a creditor "seeks only to enforce its secured claim 
against additional collateral." Id. The debtor argued that there was no indebtedness remaining, 
and that it should retain the rents. Id. It argued that any further recovery by the secured creditor 
would be unjust enrichment because the creditor was fully satisfied by the fair market value of 
the real property. Id. at 103-04. 
The panel held in favor of the secured creditor, stating that the anti-deficiency statute "is 
concerned only with actions to recover deficiency judgments after the security is exhausted." Id. 
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at 1 ( citing Hatch v. Security-First Nat 'l Bank of L.A., 120 P.2d 869 (Cal. 1942); Mortg. 
Guarantee Co. v. Sampsell, 124 P.2d 353,356 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942)). It also held that the 
stipulated fair market value "did not preclude [the secured creditor] from making a credit bid for 
less than that indebtedness." Id. at 104. The court then applied the credit bid against the debt, 
allowing the secured creditor to receive the rents as additional security up to the amount of the 
debt. Id. 
These cases are far from anomalous; other persuasive authority abounds. E.g., Phillips v. 
Utah State Credit Union, 811 P.2d 174, 178 (Utah 1991) ("We therefore hold that where a 
creditor takes more than one item of security upon an obligation secured by a trust deed, the 
creditor is not precluded from making use of that additional security merely because the creditor 
has not sought a deficiency judgment within three months of a nonjudicial sale of one of the 
items covered by the trust deed property, nor is the creditor required to seek a deficiency 
judgment ... in order to maintain its right to the additional security, so long as the security is 
applied toward the debt owed on the original loan."); Dreyfuss v. Union Bank of Cal., 11 P .3d 
383, 406 (Cal. 2000) ("[A] creditor may proceed seriatim in foreclosing against multiple items of 
collateral without commencing a judicial action to determine the fair market value of each item 
sold, and crediting that amount to the debt, before proceeding with foreclosure sales of any 
additional collateral."); Donovickv. Seattle-First Nat'! Bank, 757 P.2d 1378 (Wash. 1988) (same 
conclusion under Washington's anti-deficiency statute); see also Pfeiffer v. Morgan Stanley 
Credit Corp., 922 F. Supp. 2d 828, 832 (D. Ariz. 2012). The converse of this rule is the accepted 
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tenet that a credit bid for the full indebtedness causes that debt to be considered paid in full. See, 
e.g., Willis v. Realty Country, Inc., 121 Idaho 312,317, 824 P.2d 887, 892 (Ct. App. 1991). 
The crux of these cases is that serial recovery of a debt on collateral is not the pursuit of a 
deficiency action against the debtor personally, and thus the anti-deficiency statute does not 
apply. Because the anti-deficiency statute does not apply, the credit bid-not the court's finding 
of reasonable value-is applied to the total indebtedness to determine whether the creditor can 
continue to liquidate collateral. 
Idaho's anti-deficiency statute, by its language, only applies to actions sought against the 
debtor personally for an additional deficiency. AgStar failed to gain a deficiency judgment 
against Gordon Paving personally, which would have allowed it to execute on other property 
belonging to Gordon Paving that did not secure the debt. But, AgStar may still proceed against 
the remaining collateral to the extent that the credit bid has failed to satisfy the total 
indebtedness. The lack of a deficiency judgment does not undo what has already been decided-
that AgStar is entitled to satisfy its judgment out of the collateral. 
The total indebtedness at the time of the foreclosure decree was $9,813,340.00, and that 
debt has since earned interest, in addition to attorney fees and costs. (See R. at 221.) The credit 
bid was only $7.2 million and falls far short of making AgStar whole. (Id.) Because over $2 
million of indebtedness remained, the district court did not err in authorizing AgStar to proceed 
against the additional collateral. 
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Similarly, the District Court Did Not Err in Allowing AgStar to Realize on the 
Royalty Check. 
For the same reasons discussed in the previous section, AgStar properly realized on the 
royalty check. AgStar was simply collecting on its security as it collected on the other personal 
property collateral. While Gordon Paving may be entitled to an offset in the amount of its 
judgment (if this Court holds that the fee judgment is proper), it is not entitled to execute upon 
the same collateral that AgStar seeks to satisfy the remaining debt. 
C. The District Court Properly Awarded AgStar Its Post-Judgment Fees and Costs. 
AgStar petitioned for and received its post-judgment fees and costs that were unrelated to 
the prosecution of the deficiency judgment. (R. at 3 I 7-73; 421-22.) AgStar petitioned for its fees 
under I.C. § 12-120(5), which states: 
In all instances where a party is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs under subsection (1), (2), (3) or (4) of this section, such party shall also be 
entitled to reasonable postjudgment attorney's fees and costs incurred in 
attempting to collect on the judgment. Such attorney's fees and costs shall be set 
by the court following the filing of a memorandum of attorney's fees and costs 
with notice to all parties and hearing. 
The district court awarded AgStar its fees and costs under this subsection. (R. at 421.) 
This subsection contains no deadline for filing (nor does I.R.C.P. 54 set a deadline for 
post-judgment fees and costs), although that appears to be Gordon Paving's on:ly true objection 
to the award. (Resp. Brief at 16-1 7.) In any case, Ag Star petitioned for its fees and costs related 
to liquidating the real and personal property, among other collection issues, within a reasonable 
amount of time. The Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure was entered in June 2013. (R. at 178.) 
The real property was sold to AgStar in November 2013. (R. at 199.) After receiving approval 
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the district court, the personal property was sold in fall 2014. (R. at 282-83.) AgStar 
petitioned for post-judgment fees and costs in November 2014. (R. at 317-73.) To suggest that 
AgStar waited too long to petition for its fees and costs after this collections activity is absurd, 
and contrary to the language of the rule that provides no stated deadline. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This appeal deals with a collections matter-the nature and effect of the deficiency 
judgment or lack thereof. The district court entered a decree foreclosing the real and personal 
property of Gordon Paving, and awarded AgStar its fees and costs for liquidating the collateral. 
The only abnormality was that the district court awarded Gordon Paving its fees for defeating a 
core collections proceeding-AgStar' s request for a general writ of execution in the form of a 
deficiency judgment. AgStar requests that this Court reverse that decision, because Gordon 
Paving is not entitled to collect fees for prevailing in a post-judgment proceeding on execution. 
In sum, AgStar respectfully requests that the Court: 
1) Affirm the district court: s September 19, 2014 order allowing AgStar to 
liquidate the personal property collateral; 
2) Affirm the district court's February 20, 2015 order allowing AgStar's claim of 
exemption to the royalty check; 
3) Affirm the district comi's February 10, 2014 order allowing AgStar's post-
judgment attorney fees and costs; and 
4) Reverse the district court's November 18, 2014 judgment awarding Gordon 
Paving its attorney fees and costs. 
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DATED: September }2_, 2015. 
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